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THE QUEST FOR “LA SAPIENZA”: ROY BHASKAR’S CRITICAL
REALISM AND THE SCIENCE AND RELIGION DIALOGUE
Ante JeronČiĆ
Andrews University

In January of 2008, Pope Benedict XVI prepared to deliver an address at
the “La Sapienza” University of Rome on the place of religion in secular
societies. However, due to the objection of a number of students and
professors, including the entire physics faculty, the university revoked the
invitation two days before the scheduled event on January 15. As one of the
spokespersons against the papal appearance, the physicist Marcello Cini sent
a missive to the University Rector in which he noted “that since the time
of Descartes we have arrived at . . . a partition of spheres of competence
between the Academy and the Church. [The pope’s] clamorous violation . . .
would have been considered, in the world, as a jump backwards in time of 300
years and more.”1 For Cini, religion and science present, to invoke Stephen Jay
Gould, non-overlapping magisteria.2 Consequently, any transgression of such
inviolable demarcations, any attempt to even reopen a conversation between
those two domains of thinking, amounts to a regressive reactionism.3 On
1
See Paul Newall, “The Pope and the Gallileo Affair,” http://thekindlyones.
org/2010/10/16/the-pope-and-the-galileo-affair/.
I first presented a version of this article at the interdisciplinary 2013 Andrews
Autumn Conference on Religion and Science. Much of the rhetorical structure and
content aimed for that occasion has been preserved here. Additionally, I remain
indebted to friends and colleagues whose feedback made an invaluable contribution
in crafting this article: Vanessa Corredera, Karl Bailey, and L. Monique Pittman. They
enable me to practice the discourse of transversality on a weekly basis.
2
See, for example, Stephen Jay Gould, “Two Separate Domains,” in Philosophy of
Religion: Selected Readings, ed. Michael L. Peterson, et al. (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1996), 556.
3
Of course, there were those who condemned the snubbing of the Pope,
including the then Italian Prime Minister Romano Prodi who contended that “no
voice should be stifled in our country” (Ian Fisher, “Pope Cancels Speech after
Protest at University,” The New York Times, January 16 2008, http://www.nytimes.
com/2008/01/16/world/europe/16pope.html). Or take Giorgio Israel’s response
printed on the afternoon of January 15 in the L’Osservatore Romano. Israel, himself
a professor in the department of mathematics at “La Sapienza,” argued that “it is
surprising that those who have chosen as their motto the famous phrase attributed to
Voltaire—‘I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to
say it’—should oppose the pope’s delivering an address . . . . In this incident there has
emerged a part of secular culture that makes no arguments, but demonizes. It does not
discuss, like true secular culture does, but creates monsters” (Sandro Magister, “The
University of Rome Closes Its Doors to the Pope,”
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this count, the very adage of “faith and science” is oxymoronic at best and
perilous at worst.
However, as one reads the text of the ill-fated address it becomes clear
that Benedict’s intent was not to undermine the role of science, but rather to
situate it within a broader conversation of what constitutes rationality and
human flourishing.4 As he puts it elsewhere, there is a “necessary relatedness
between reason and faith and between reason and religion, which are called to
purify and help one another. They need each other, and they must acknowledge
this mutual need” as they challenge each other’s pathologies.5 Benedict echoes
similar concerns in his 2006 Regensburg address “Faith, Reason and the
University” in which he proffers a sustained critique of “dehellenization,”
namely, a critique of those intellectual tendencies that undermine the
synthesis of faith and reason as achieved through the confluence of Christian
and Greek thought. Medieval nominalism, Kant’s radicalization of Protestant
antimetaphysical impulses, and Adolf Harnack’s reduction of the Christian
message to humanitarian moralism are but some of the forces that have
led to the subjectivization and privatization of faith. Benedict rejects such
tendencies and instead calls for “courage to engage the whole breadth of
reason, and not the denial of its grandeur—this is the programme with which
a theology grounded in Biblical faith enters into the debates of our time.”6
While I am much less sanguine than the Pope about the all-round
beneficence of the “hellenization of Christianity,” I side with his basic intent
to articulate a positive relationship between science and religion, and in the
process provide a nuanced account of the modes, scope, and responsibilities
of rationality. He rightly suggests that the multilayeredness of reality calls for
a textured account of cognition that evades the trappings of evidentialism,
scientism, or fideism. In this article I want to elaborate on some of these
intuitions via Roy Bhaskar’s critical realist theoretical framework.7 “Intuitions”
http://chiesa.espresso.repubblica.it/articolo/186421?eng=y).
4
The ill-fated address itself was published on January 16, 2008.
5
Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger and Jürgen Habermas, Dialectics of Secularization: On
Reason and Religion, trans. Florian Schuller (San Francisco: Ignatius, 2006), 78.
6
Benedict XVI, “Faith, Reason and the University: Memories and
Reflections,” 2006 Regensburg Address, http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/
benedict_xvi/speeches/2006/september/documents/hf_ben-xvi_spe_20060912_
university-regensburg_en.html.
7
Critical realism names a spectrum of philosophical positions ranging from
various appropriations of Immanuel Kant’s transcendental idealism to different
Anglo-American approaches from the 1920s onward, including the pioneering work
of theologian-scientists such as John Polkinghorne, Arthur Peacock, and Ian Barbour.
For helpful definitions of critical realism see John C. Polkinghorne, Belief in God in
an Age of Science (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998), 105–9, and Ilkka
Niiniluoto, Critical Scientific Realism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 1–2.
Niiniluoto lists the following types of realism: ontological, semantic, epistemological,
axiological, methodological, and ethical.
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is the right word here as I have in mind a certain complementarity of
concerns of those two thinkers, rather than an overlap in their respective
epistemological approaches. In order to streamline my discussion, I will
primarily focus on Bhaskar’s critique of “epistemic fallacy,” his differentiation
between the intransitive and transitive domains of science, and the idea
of stratified reality.8 I will then conclude the article by delineating several
implications that Bhaskar’s perspective carries not only for the dialogue of
science and religion, but also the nature of theological inquiry in relationship
to critical realism.
Reality Claims and the “Epistemic Fallacy”
To begin with, Bhaskar poses the following deceptively simple question: “What
must the world be like for science to be possible?”9 In other words, what are
the transcendental condition(s) required for someone to be able to undertake
scientific inquiry? Note that by “transcendental condition” we are referring
not to classical foundationalist presuppositions, i.e. some universal, indubitable
epistemic postulates, but rather the necessary conditions for X—X standing
for an activity, practice, etc.—to be conceivable at all.10 For example, we might
ask, “What is the transcendental condition for something like speech to be
possible?” Presumably, our response would point to the necessity of language
in whatever form, including winking and the crooning of whales. Now, notice
how Bhaskar asks what the world, and not the mind, must be like for science
to work. That simple distinction carries a hefty polemical punch, one that
aims, quite explicitly, at Immanuel Kant’s transcendental idealism. On Kant’s
terms, as one might recall, “any inquiry of the form ‘what must be the case
for f to be possible,’ the conclusion, X, would be a fact about us and that
f must invariably stand for some universal operation of mind.”11 In short,
Kant reduces the transcendental question about cognition to epistemology,
or rather, human subjectivity.
Notwithstanding his sympathies for Kant, Bhaskar diverges from him
on this point and instead argues that questions of ontology, rather than those
of epistemology, ought to frame our transcendental concerns. In so doing, he
rejects the subjectivist, “idealist and individualist cast into which Kant pressed
his own inquiries.”12 That is, he forgoes the focus on the “‘unknowable
Critical realism as it applies to Bhaskar’s thought is a contraction of two
interrelated lines of exploration: his “transcendental realism” (philosophy of science)
on the one hand and his “critical naturalism” (special philosophy of human sciences)
on the other. See Roy Bhaskar, Reclaiming Reality: A Critical Introduction to Contemporary
Philosophy (New York: Verso, 1989), 190.
9
Roy Bhaskar, A Realist Theory of Science (New York: Verso, 2008), 13, 26.
10
See Levi R. Bryant, The Democracy of Objects (Ann Arbor, MI: Open Humanities,
2011), 43. I am indebted to Bryant for some of the ideas and wording in this paragraph.
11
Roy Bhaskar, The Possibility of Naturalism: A Philosophical Critique of the
Contemporary Human Sciences, 3rd ed. (New York: Routledge, 1998), 5.
12
Ibid., 5.
8
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‘noumena’ or things-in-themselves which haunt Kant’s philosophy.” At
the same time, he “does not dispense with them in the same way as Kant’s
idealist successors did—by denying that there is a world independent of the
knowledge minds may have of it.”13 He is interested, instead, in the ontological
conditions that account for the possibility of knowledge by asking: “What
must the world be like for science to be possible?”
This form of argumentation, I should add, is absolutely central to
Bhaskar’s proposal. It leads him to reject the “epistemic fallacy” and its “failure
to differentiate ontological from epistemological considerations.”14 Put
succinctly, the fallacy names unwarranted inferences about the being of objects
from our knowledge of them, in effect allowing epistemology to set the bar for
what is ontologically real.15 One hears such things regularly, I suspect, when
teaching undergraduate classes in philosophy, ethics, or related disciplines.
For example, students will say, “There are so many different, incompatible
understandings of A, therefore one true A does not exist.” In other words,
they reason from the fact of pluralism to metaphysical or ethical nihilism,
often couched, rather curiously and paradoxically, in some insipid language
of inclusivity and empathy. A similar kind of logic can be seen, to use a more
highbrow example, in the case of logical positivists and their insistence on the
principle of verifiability—the claim that propositions that cannot be verified
or falsified, excluding tautologies, are meaningless statements.16 Here too the
order of knowledge is inverted by reducing the reality of being to the level of
empirical knowing.
Bhaskar’s language of intransitive (ontological dimension) and transitive
(epistemological dimension) aspects of scientific inquiry mirrors such a
differentiation of ontology and epistemology. In regards to the intransitive
dimension, he reminds us that “knowledge is ‘of ’ things which are not
produced by men at all: the specific gravity of mercury, the process of

Andrew Collier, Critical Realism: An Introduction to Roy Bhaskar’s Philosophy (New
York: Verso, 1994), 22.
14
Roy Bhaskar, Dialectic: The Pulse of Freedom (New York: Verso, 1993), 138. On
Kant and critical realism see Michael Friedman and Alfred Nordmann, eds., The
Kantian Legacy in Nineteenth-Century Science (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006).
15
Bhaskar, Realist Theory, 26. For a good summary of this point see Margaret
Scotford Archer, Andrew Collier, and Douglas V. Porpora, “Introduction,” in
Transcendence: Critical Realism and God, ed. Margaret Scotford Archer, Andrew Collier,
and Douglas V. Porpora (New York: Routledge, 2004), 1. A similar logic is at
play in Descartes’s Discourse on Method where we have a shift from epistemological
considerations of what the we can indubitably know to claims about what is
essentially real and true, i.e. the mind. On this point see John Cottingham, “General
Introduction,” in Meditations on First Philosophy, by René Descartes, edited by John
Cottingham (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), xxx.
16
Bhaskar, Realist Theory, 27–8.
13
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electrolysis, the mechanism of light propagation. None of these ‘objects of
knowledge’ depend upon human activity.”17 Namely,
surface appearances are only the experimental, or empirical, aspect of
deeper structures and mechanisms which allow the surface appearances to
be explained, and about which it is possible to gain knowledge. There is thus
a fundamental ontological distinction to be made between the underlying
causal mechanisms of nature and the observable patterns of events within
nature, whether these are observed in the natural world itself, or under the
somewhat more artificial world of the carefully controlled experiment. The
underlying causal mechanisms may be said to be the intransitive object
of scientific inquiry, whereas the empirical regularities are the transitive
products of scientific investigation.18

Thus even if we assume, as we ought, that perceptions do not give us
right representations of external reality, we should not automatically infer that
we cannot say anything meaningful about it, or that correspondence theories
of truth, even chastised ones, are untenable.19 As Kees van Kooten Niekerk
rightly notes, conceptualizations of the world are “constrained by the character
of our sensations. Our sensations permit different conceptualizations of
trees and rivers, but unification of trees and rivers under one common
concept would ignore many obvious differences. . . .” In other words, “senseexperience sets narrow limits to what can be accepted as faithful (or true)
statements about the (mental or internal) world.”20
That being said, Bhaskar rightly contends that “any adequate philosophy
of science must find a way of grappling with this central paradox of science:
that men in their social activity produce knowledge which is a social product
much like any other”;21 in other words, it has to account for the transitive
Bhaskar, Reclaiming Reality, 21.
Alister E. McGrath, A Scientific Theology: Reality, vol. 2 (New York: T&T Clark,
2002), 213.
19
For instance, see Hilary Putnam, Reason, Truth, and History (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1981), 73. For this reference to Putnam I am indebted
to Kees van Kooten Niekerk, “A Critical Realist Perspective on the Dialogue between
Theology and Science,” in Rethinking Theology and Science: Six Epistemological Models
for the Current Dialogue, ed. Niels Henrik Gregersen and J. Wentzel Van Huyssteen
(Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1998), 57.
20
Niekerk, “A Critical Realist Perspective,” 57. Similarly, Murphy writes: “While
concepts are human contrivances and not pictures or representations, they are
shared by a real world. And given a stable set of concepts, we can go on to formulate
sentences, most of whose criteria for acceptance (or acceptance as true) can best be
described as a combination of coherence and empirical adequacy. . . . Given a stable
conceptual system, truth is, in part, a function of the way the world is” (Nancey
Murphy, “The Limits of Pragmatism and the Limits of Realism,” Zygon 28 [1993]:
354, cited in D. Paul La Motagne, Barth and Rationality: Critical Realism in Theology
[Eugene, OR: Cascade, 2012], 47). See also Michael Devitt, Realism and Truth, 2nd ed.
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), 24.
21
Bhaskar, Realist Theory, 11.
17
18
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dimension of knowledge. Such recognition of the theory-laden, linguistically
mediated, systemically intertwined, and culturally reflective character of
knowledge calls for an account of epistemic fallibilism. Again, this does
not preclude the possibility of judgmental rationality about the world, i.e.
the ability to provide more or less adequate approximation of what reality
is really like.22 Philosophical approaches that refuse the very possibility of
such critical adjudication—including various forms of subjectivism and antirealist constructivism—Bhaskar describes as “endemically aporetic.”23 In that
regard, he would readily concur with Benedict’s observation that we as human
beings are “not trapped in a hall of mirrors of interpretations; one can and
must seek a breakthrough to what is really true.”24
On Stratification and Meta-Reality
In addition to these reflections on the relationship of ontology and
epistemology, Bhaskar reminds us that different disciplines—physics,
chemistry, biology, sociology, and so on—have as their focus different strata
of reality, each being irreducible to the other.25 Reminiscent of Aristotle’s
Archer, Collier, and Porpora, “Introduction,” 2.
Roy Bhaskar, Plato Etc.: The Problems of Philosophy and Their Resolution (New
York: Verso, 1994), 16. See also Michael Redhead, From Physics to Metaphysics (New
York: University of Cambridge, 1995), ch. 2; John R. Searle, The Construction of
Social Reality (New York: Free Press, 1995). For a similar assessment in the field
of moral philosophy see Samuel Scheffler, “Introduction,” in On What Matters, by
Derek Parfit, 2 vols., vol. 1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), xxxiii. Very
few philosophers, including postmodern ones, actually subscribe to the contention
that all reality is but a linguistic construct. In fact, postmodern thought, in many of
its incarnations, simply represents a more radicalized form of critical realism. Note,
for example, Umberto Eco’s point: “Even though the interpreters cannot decide
which interpretation is the privileged one, they can agree on the fact that certain
interpretations are not contextually legitimated. Thus, even though using a text as
a playground for implementing unlimited semiosis, they can agree that at certain
moments the ‘play of musement’ can transitorily stop by producing a consensual
judgment. Indeed, symbols grow but do not remain empty” (Umberto Eco, The
Limits of Interpretation [Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1994], 41–2).
24
Benedict XVI, “Culture and Truth: Some Reflections on the Encyclical Letter
Fides et Ratio,” in The Essential Pope Benedict XVI: His Central Writings and Speeches, ed.
John F. Thornton and Susan B. Varenne (New York: HarperOne, 2007), 368, as cited
in Ralph Del Colle, “David Bentley Hart and Pope Benedict: Atheist Delusions, the
Regensburg Lecture, and Beyond,” Nova et Vetera 9, no. 2 (2001): 307.
25
For an alternative account of multi-layered reality see Michael Polanyi, The
Tacit Dimension (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1996), 29-32. For this connection to
Polanyi I am indebted to McGrath, A Scientific Theology: Reality, 219. Bhaskar notes: “A
general pattern of scientific activity emerges from this. When a stratum of reality has
been adequately described the next step consists in the discovery of the mechanisms
responsible for behavior at that level. The key move in this involves the postulation
22
23
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emphasis on the interdependence of ontology and methodology, Bhaskar
points out that “only the concept of ontological depth can reveal the actual
historical stratification of the sciences as anything other than an accident. For
this can now be seen as grounded in the multi-tiered stratification of reality,
and the consequent logic-of-discovery that stratification imposes on science.”26
Such an ontology of stratified emergence has numerous implications, not least
of which is the idea that methodology in the sciences cannot be encapsulated
in a priori foundationalist points of departure. It is the object or strata that
“determines the form of its possible science.”27 It stands to reason, therefore,
that “each scientific discipline demands an approach to its subject area which
is determined by its own distinctive features—a notion which is encapsulated
in the Greek phrase kata physin, ‘according to its own nature.’”28
The concept of “emergent order” that Bhaskar articulates here bears
similarities to the philosophical notion of “supervenience” according to
which “higher-level properties supervene on lower-level properties if they
are partially constituted by the lower-level properties but are not directly
reducible to them.”29 One simply cannot, for example, explain various forms
of social interaction by looking at leptons or brain scans of the prefrontal
orbital cortex.30 Instead, “emergent phenomena are frequently taken to be
irreducible, to be unpredictable or unexplainable, to require novel concepts,
and to be holistic.”31 Such principle of emergence prevents one from
of hypothetical entities and mechanisms, whose reality can then be ascertained.
Such entities need not be smaller in size, though in physics and chemistry this has
normally proved to be the case” (Bhaskar, Realist Theory, 169).
26
Bhaskar, The Possibility of Naturalism, 14. For this reference to Bhaskar I am
indebted to James K. Dew, Science and Theology: An the Assessment of Alister McGrath’s
Critical Realist Perspective (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2010), 109–10.
27
Bhaskar, The Possibility of Naturalism, 3.
28
Alister E. McGrath, The Science of God: An Introduction to Scientific Theology
(Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2004), 18.
29
Nancey C. Murphy and G. F. Rayner Ellis, On the Moral Nature of the Universe:
Theology, Cosmology, and Ethics (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1996), 22–3.
30
The pluralistic aspect in the sciences can also be seen in the tendency “towards
a diversification of conceptualities, methods, approaches, paradigms, and cognitive
values. A discipline like biology, for instance, is organized in historical as well as
in experimental departments, and among its methods defined historical inference,
morphological descriptions, chemical analysis, refinement [or critique] of the theorystructure of Darwinism, and so on. Hence, even within the natural sciences disunity
has indeed become a matter of fact” (Niels Henrik Gergersen and J. Wentzel van
Huyssteen, “Introduction,” in Rethinking Theology and Science: Six Models for the Current
Dialogue, ed. Niels Henrik Gregersen and J. Wentzel Van Huyssteen [Grand Rapids,
MI: Eerdmans, 1998], 3–4).
31
Mark Bedau and Paul Humphreys, “Introduction to Philosophical Perspectives
on Emergence,” in Emergence: Contemporary Readings in Philosophy and Science, ed. Mark
Bedau and Paul Humphreys (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2008), 9.
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settling on any particular, all-encompassing method of investigating the
different strata.32 What is needed, instead, is an allowance for polysyllabic
or multileveled accounts of reality whose ontological “depth” may never be
descriptively exhausted.33
It is in this context that Bhaskar proposes his concept of meta-reality
that connotes “both the idea of transcendence, that is going to a level beyond
or behind and between reality, while at the same time the ‘reality’ in the title
makes it clear that this level is still real, and so part of the very same totality
that critical realism has been describing all along.”34 That is to say, meta-reality
names attempts to capture the unified nature of things, a sense of wholeness
that eludes normal scientific inquiry. The evocation of transcendence here,
as Bhaskar understands, it not a matter of arbitrary fiat, but rather describes
the grammar of a critically astute re-enchantment of reality against various
forms of modernistic or naturalistic reductionism. Of course, such turn
to transcendence, and with it the discourse of the “whole” and “limits,” is
not only the provenance of religion; non-theistic philosophers such as Iris
Murdoch too have argued that the idea of transcendence is synchronous with
both ordinary human experience and science.35 “The idea of a self-contained
unity or limited whole,” Murdoch writes, “is a fundamental instinctive
concept. We see parts of things, we intuit whole things. . . . The urge to prove
that where we intuit unity there really is unity is a deep emotional motive to
philosophy, to art, to thinking itself.”36
While much more could be said about Bhaskar’s particular brand of
critical realism, even our limited discussion is suggestive of implications his
approach might have not only for the dialogue of science and religion, but
also questions of theological method. In the section to follow, I will briefly
explore six such areas of interest.

32
Bhaskar, Realist Theory, 171. This is in contrast to Edward O. Wilson who
claims that “we are approaching a new age of synthesis, when the testing of
consilience is the greatest of all intellectual challenges. Philosophy, the contemplation
of the unknown, is a shrinking dominion. We have the common goal of turning as
much philosophy as possible into science” (Edward O. Wilson, Consilience: The Unity
of Knowledge [New York: Knopf, 1998], 10).
33
For a helpful delineation of concept of “depth” see Iris Murdoch, Metaphysics
as a Guide to Morals (New York: Penguin, 1993), 55.
34
Roy Bhaskar, Meta-Reality: The Philosophy of Meta-Reality (Thousand Oaks, CA:
Sage, 2002), 175. For this reference to Bhaskar I am indebted to Alister McGrath,
The Open Secret: A New Vision for Natural Theology (Oxford: Blackwell, 2008), 52.
35
For an excellent discussion of transcendence in contemporary thought see
Regina M. Schwartz, ed., Transcendence: Philosophy, Literature, and Theology Approach the
Beyond (New York: Routledge, 2004).
36
Murdoch, Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals, 1.
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The Dialogue of Science and Religion: Some Tentative Proposals
1. Bhaskar’s double entendre on epistemic mimesis, i.e. the idea that
knowledge while pointing to reality is always somehow conditioned, entails a
word of caution to both practitioners of science and theology. All forms of
inquiry, as van Huyssteen points out, “share alike the groping and tentative
tools of humankind: words, ideas, and images that have been handed
down and which we refashion and reinterpret for our context in light of
contemporary experience.”37 It is that recognition, in fact, that gives “science
a degree of kinship with other forms of human enquiry.”38 Consequently,
someone operating from the perspective of Bhaskar’s theoretical starting
point will be critical of the proverbial fact/value distinction and the implied
empiricist reductionism of what constitutes “true” knowledge. Iris Murdoch
rightly reminds us, for example, that “almost all of our concepts and activities
involve evaluation. In the majority of cases, a survey of the facts will itself
involve moral discrimination. Innumerable forms of evaluation haunt our
simplest decisions.”39 In that sense she would concur with Nietzsche’s
insistence, as would I, that truth requires a “training in truthfulness.” It also
requires “self-critical honesty” given that the pursuit of truth leads us into a
“complex and uneven terrain where influences, prejudices, doubts, histories,
loves, emotions, politics, experiences all jostle for a fair hearing. There is no
one systematic rationality that can accommodate all of this.”40 That applies to
all forms of knowing, including science and theology.
2. Both critical realism and theological inquiry have a share in their mutual
commitment to the ontological intransitivity of reality. While precluding forms
of naïve correspondence theory of truth, as referential discourses they both
reject the argument that descriptions of reality amount to little more than
solipsistic projections or putative truth statements furtively twisted to conform
to a scientist’s agenda.41 After all, “theological propositions about the world
Wentzel Van Huyssteen, The Shaping of Rationality: Toward Interdisciplinarity in
Theology and Science (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1999), 218.
38
See John C. Polkinghorne, Scientists as Theologians: A Comparison of the Writings
of Ian Barbour, Arthur Peacocke and John Polkinghorne (London: SPCK, 1996), 4.
39
Murdoch, Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals, 26. Murdoch, in other words,
contends that “facts on their own, understood as discrete pieces of data, do not
constitute a neutral truth which is capable of conveying some sense of meaning or
saying anything essential about the world. They are not inert but connected to value
by individual (moral) judgment, an unavoidable and continuing mode of evaluation
and knowledge” (Heather Widdows, The Moral Vision of Iris Murdoch [Burlington, VT:
Ashgate, 2005], 60).
40
Giles Fraser, “On the Genealogy of Morals, Part 7: Nietzsche Contra
Dogma,” Cif Belief, The Guardian, December 8, 2008, http://www.theguardian.com/
commentisfree/2008/dec/08/nietzsche-part-seven.
41
See for example Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar, Laboratory Life: The Social
Construction of Scientific Facts, vol. 80, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1986).
37
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concern the same real world as scientific statements,”42 which in turn reminds
us that Christianity, in distinction to some other religions, is unintelligible
apart from its reality claims. That is why a critical realist theology—or at least
a Christian theology sympathetic to the ontological intransitivity tenet of
Bhaskar’s critical realism—will spurn proposals that define religion as being
only a meaning-generating endeavor (à la Peter Berger’s “sacred canopy”).43
3. While Roy Bhaskar’s critical realism provides a helpful theoretical
framework for addressing the dialogue of science and religion, we need
additional specificity concerning the character of rationality informing such
a dialogue. In that regard, van Huyssteen’s nonfoundationalist critical realism
provides invaluable suggestions. Building on Calvin Schrag, Huyssteen’s
approach accords a prominent role to “transversal rationality,” i.e. a form of
reasoning “where our multiple beliefs and practices, our habits of thought
and attitudes, our prejudices and assessments, converge.”44 Transversality, in
other words, enables us to envision spaces of convergence hospitable to both
personal convictions and interdisciplinary normative judgments informed
by the criteria of “intelligibility and optimal understanding, responsible
judgment, progressive problem-solving, and experiential adequacy.”45 How
this might work out in practice is a whole different issue, one that goes
beyond the purview of this article. Pointing to an exciting area of exploration,
however, I would suggest that much could be gained from juxtaposing
van Huyssteen’s conception of rationality and Hans Georg Gadamer’s
philosophical hermeneutics, particularly his notion of “fusion of horizons”
(Horizontverschmelzung).46 Exploring the dialectics of epistemology and
hermeneutics, knowing and understanding, might open new ways for science
and religion to interact in a truly transdisciplinary fashion. Ursula King shares
such sentiments when she notes that
a “fusion of horizons” will lead to larger horizons, to new views and shared
understanding. This fusion is also important for the dialogue between
science and religion, and it is likely to be far more creative and holistic
than advocating a strongly adversarial stance between these universes of
discourse and knowing. . . . Fusing and expanding the horizons of both
Niekerk, “A Critical Realist Perspective,” 78.
See Peter L. Berger, The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion
(New York: Doubleday, 1967), especially ch. 1 and 2.
44
Van Huyssteen, The Shaping of Rationality, 136. Calvin Schrag popularized the
concept of “transversal rationality” in his The Resources of Rationality: A Response to the
Postmodern Challenge (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1992), particularly
ch. 6.
45
Ibid., 12. For a good discussion of this issue see Kenneth A. Reynhout, “The
Evolution of van Huyssteen’s Model of Rationality,” in The Evolution of Rationality:
Interdisciplinary Essays in Honor of J. Wentzel Van Huyssteen, ed. Wentzel Van Huyssteen
and F. LeRon Shults (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2006), 7–12.
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Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, 2nd ed. (New York: Crossroad,
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science and religion through creative dialogue from many perspectives
could be of immense benefit for humankind.47

4. The affirmation of transversal rationality implies additional levels of
opportunity and responsibility. For one, theology must refrain from laissezfaire special pleadings when its specific reality claims are being questioned. I
think that this needs to be stressed—particularly in the Adventist context—as
there is a tendency at times to shield the authority of the Bible and privileged
hermeneutical approaches from the onslaught of science by resorting to a
curious type of epistemological nihilism. Not infrequently, theology attempts
to insulate itself from criticism by piggybacking on those accounts that define
religion as a protected domain. Such shielding comes through stratagems of
subjectivization, demythologization, and “cultural-linguistic”48 sequestering
of either the Kantian, Hegelian, Wittgensteinian, or some other variety, at
times bordering on the disingenuous. We cannot stress enough, therefore,
that the dialogue between science and religion needs to commence with a
high degree of respect for scientific inquiry and a willingness, in principle, to
be corrected and changed. It is true that scientific theories are often fraught
with ideological overlays, in the same way that theological interpretations are.
Yet, theology ought not to hide behind the sophistry of perpetual deferment,
one that implicitly claims, “We will accept scientific discoveries once or as
long as they fit our doctrinal bill.” Caution and critical distance are prudent;
equivocation and intellectual dishonesty are not. Niekerk is thus correct in
reminding us that
theology has an interest in science with regards to the performance of its
proper task. The reason is the critical realist assignment of theology. This
assignment involves the task of subjecting the realist claims of particular
versions of a Christian worldview to a critical assessment, and in order to
do so theology has to take into account the compatibility of those claims
with science. . . . [A] serious consideration of the scientific understanding
of the natural world is part of the critical assignment of a theology that
purports to be realistic.49

5. A theology sympathetic to critical realism will concur that reality
cannot be reduced to any particular strata or to a particular scientific method.
Ursula King, “The Journey beyond Athens and Jerusalem,” Zygon 40, no.
3 (September 2005): 538. For the reference to King I am indebted to Kenneth
A. Reynhout, “The Hermeneutics of Transdisciplinarity: A Gadamerian Model
of Transversal Reasoning,” http://www.metanexus.net/essay/hermeneuticstransdisciplinarity-gadamerian-model-transversal-reasoning. While the suggestion
to explore the relationship of van Huyssteen and Gadamer is a product of my own
research, I am grateful to Reynhout for directing me to important resources and
possible avenues of exploration.
48
I am adapting George Lindbeck’s term here to name a canopy of fideistic
approaches to religion and theology. For Lindbeck’s delineation of the concept
see The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age (Philadelphia:
Westminster, 1984), 40–1.
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Of course, this raises all kinds of questions, including the place of philosophy
and theology in the stratification of reality. Murphy, for example, proposes
a hierarchy of sciences where metaphysics/theology ends up on top as
the most generalized approach to reality. In that context, theology will be
interested in accounts that point to the “depth” of reality—here variously
understood as the “ground of being” or “inexhaustible mystery”—while fully
acknowledging that the idea of “depth” need not be stated in theistic terms.
Equally important, I believe, is the claim that theology is also horizontally
related to the various strata. In that sense, “critical realism encourages a
connectivist approach to theology, by insisting that its correlation with the
various strata of reality be explored, both as a means of intellectual enrichment
and as a matter of intellectual responsibility.”50 Such an affirmation opens up
a whole new space for a chastised natural theology, one that is demonstrative
rather than prescriptive. It privileges the language of inferences, fittingness,
and resonances as it probes perennial human interests in the idea of
transcendent in relationship to human well-being. With that in mind, I concur
with Benedict’s insistence that a principle task of philosophy and theology is
to “sift the non-scientific element out of the scientific results with which it is
often entangled, thus keeping open our awareness of the totality and of the
broader dimensions of the reality of human existence—or science can never
show us more than partial aspects of this existence.”51
6. Finally, Bhaskar’s recognition of the transitive domain and the way
human cognition is shaped by individual, institutional, and cultural factors,
pushes the discussion of science and religion, invariably so, into the domain
of ethics. That is, the scope of the dialogue must go beyond matters of
metaphysics and epistemology to include the issue of moral responsibility.
The ethical dimension itself consists of two, broadly-construed layers. On
the first level we are confronted with questions of (mis)conduct of scientific
research, including matters of institutional negligence, deliberate fabrication
of data, intentional omission of all known data, authorship and intellectual
property, use of animals and human subjects, and so on.52 Now, of course, I
do not mean to suggest that all such considerations somehow need a religious
perspective in order to be illuminating and ethically directing. I do, however,
maintain the position that some of these questions press against deeper
frameworks of meaning and metaphysics. As anyone interested in the field
of moral philosophy will readily admit, the moment you focus on matters of
applied ethics, questions of metaphysics begin looming in the background.
McGrath, A Scientific Theology: Reality, 240.
Ratzinger and Habermas, Dialectics of Secularization, 56–7.
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John D’Angelo, Ethics in Science: Ethical Misconduct in Scientific Research (New
York: CRC, 2012). He discusses issues such as institutional negligence, deliberate
fabrication of data, deliberate omission of all known data, authorship and intellectual
property, etc. Also see Bernard E. Rollin, Science and Ethics (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2006) for a good treatment of how ethics is often ignored to the
detriment of science and society.
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The second level, on the other hand, addresses the questions of
consequences and utilization. I am reminded here of the important claim that
Glenn Stassen and David P. Gushee make in their Kingdom Ethics where they
caution about the science-technology-commerce connection that both exerts
pressure on our moral sensibilities and urgently invites ethical deliberations.53
To overlook the connection of science and capital is as negligent as it is
naïve. I do not need to dwell here on the usual stock of ethical quandaries
connected with environmental degradation, biotechnology, trans-humanism,
nuclear armament, and so on. What I do want to reiterate is, however, the
need for the faith and science dialogue to encompass efforts to articulate
goods, norms, and judgments that are, in Hans Jonas’s words, “compatible
with the permanence of genuine human life.”54 It is to insist that ethics
cannot be removed from the conversation table as it points to the essential
task of constructing moral ontologies that account “of the meaning of our
being in the world and how to orient ourselves in the world.”55 In other words,
it is to reject the severance of scientific and technological development from
fundamental “questions of integral human development.”56 Murphy helpfully
notes:
We claim that ethical knowledge is logically related to knowledge about the
way the world is as well as to knowledge of transcendent reality. Thus, ethical
judgments should be affected by developments in scientific knowledge but
cannot be determined by scientific knowledge alone. This is the limited truth
in the fact-value distinction . . . . Furthermore, we claim that sciences are
not “value-free”; the applied human sciences provide knowledge of meansends relations, and choice of ends presumes judgments about the good for
humanity. Since the natural sciences are dependent on the development of
technology (applied science) they to are inevitably tied to the ethical realm.57

It stands to reason, therefore, that faith practitioners concerned about
science and theology ought to be supportive of organizations and efforts that
seek to bring scientists and human rights advocates to the same table. (The
Carnegie Mellon University Center for Human Rights Science is one such
laudatory forum. It “brings together scientists and human rights practitioners
committed to rigorous assessment of the state of human rights around the
world”).58
See Glenn H. Stassen and David P. Gushee, Kingdom Ethics: Following Jesus in the
Contemporary Context (Downers Grove, IL: IVP, 2003), 257–8.
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University Press, 1995), 38.
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In closing, we return to Benedict’s reminder that what our civilization
urgently needs is the pursuit of integrated or sapiential rationality; a kind of
“cosmopolis” (Stephen Toulmin) that convincingly recaptures the mediaeval
vision of “an over all harmony between the order of the heavens (the
Cosmos) and the order of human affairs (Polis).”59 As Murphy and Ellis claim,
there is a great hunger today “to relate our burgeoning knowledge of the
cosmos to the pursuit of human meaning, both in the sense of meaningful,
fulfilling ways of life (ethics and politics) and in the sense of the quest for an
understanding of ultimate reality (religion).”60 Benedict strongly echoes this
point in Caritas in Veritate where he warns against the instrumentalization of
reason that severs scientific discoveries and technological development from
matters of moral responsibility, virtue, and human rights. “When technology
is allowed to take over,” he argues, “the result is confusion between ends and
means, such that the sole criterion for action in businesses is thought to be the
maximization of profit, in politics the consolidation of power, and in science
the findings of research.” What is frequently overlooked is that “underneath
the intricacies of economic, financial, and political interconnections, there
remain misunderstandings, hardships, and injustice.”61 Addressing such
issues of systemic injustice and imbalance is a complicated endeavor, one
that requires both different forms of advocacy and scholarly explorations.
But certainly one legitimate way to pursue such a task is to strive to bring
faith and reason together, to “overcome the self-imposed limitation of reason
to the empirically falsifiable” and “so continually [seek to] disclose its vast
horizons.”62 The quest for la sapienza or wisdom is more, but certainly not
less than that.
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